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1. Introduction
1 
The present budget of the European Union has long 
ceased to represent European policy priorities; it is the 
result of decisions taken decades ago and subsequent 
incremental adjustments decided under the pressure of 
external events or for political expediency. Its 
increasing detachment from emerging needs and 
policy priorities undermines support for the Union 
among public opinion. 
Most resources are transferred to the EU budget from 
national budgets – thus apparently falsifying the Treaty 
prescription on own resources – and the member states 
negotiate the repartition among themselves of spending 
on agriculture and structural funds, and resulting net 
balances. National interests are framed in terms of how 
much national treasuries will pay and what farmers and 
regions will receive back home. 
The main multi-annual spending programmes are 
decided separately by the European Council, based on 
discussions in different Council formations. Often, 
when they come before the Council for consideration, 
decisions are already prejudged by agreements between 
the main countries. The role of Parliament has been a 
subsidiary one, since their powers under the Treaty are 
scanty; budgetary matters have not been an issue for 
European elections, since the duration of the multi-
annual financial framework (MFF) is unrelated to the 
term of office of Parliament and the decisions are taken 
behind closed doors by the European Council. 
This state of affairs must radically change following the 
ongoing review: with the MFF that will start in 2014, 
the EU budget should really become an instrument to 
support and foster current policy goals. 
                                                      
1 This paper builds upon ideas first presented in the response 
to the European Commission’s public consultation on the 
2008-09 budget review, available at the following address: 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/library/contributions/us/ 
20080415_US_33. pdf. 
In May 2006 Parliament, Council and Commission 
agreed that the Commission would “undertake a full, 
wide ranging review covering all aspects of EU 
spending, including the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), and of resources, including the UK rebate, and 
report in 2008-09”.
2 The mandate is therefore broad 
and no issue is excluded: the Commission should set 
ambitious targets for itself and not shirk from 
addressing controversial issues, since its proposals will 
play an important role in shaping the outcome of the 
budget review. 
This Policy Brief considers possible changes in the 
budget structure that would provide a separate and 
transparent account of its main activities. It also 
addresses the issue of net balances, the possible role of 
a European tax and European bonds, and some changes 
in decision-making procedures.   
The main proposal is that the European budget could be 
reorganised in a tripartite form, with separate Chapters 
for its redistributive tasks, the production of European 
public goods and the use of financial resources raised in 
capital markets for large projects of European interest. 
Net balances should only arise in connection with 
redistributive transfers between the member states and 
be closely aligned to an index of countries’ relative 
prosperity, as will be discussed. These changes, and 
some related adaptations of decision-making 
                                                      
2 Commission document SEC (2007) 1188 final, 
Communication from the Commission “Reforming the 
budget, changing Europe – A public consultation paper in 
view of the 2008-09 budget review”, p. 2. 
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procedures, should make it possible for the European 
budget to become the subject of partisan political 
debates in the public arena for the European elections. 
2.  A new structure for the EU budget: 
current operations 
The EU budget today comprises two activities of a very 
different nature: on the one hand, the redistribution of 
resources between the member states, on the other, the 
production of European ‘public goods’ through 
common institutions and policies. While broadly 
responding to shared goals, redistribution is 
conceptually and analytically quite different from the 
implementation of common policies to foster, say, free 
movement, internal security or food safety, which are 
European ‘public goods’ and belong to the ‘allocative’ 
function of a public budget, in the classical definition 
of Musgrave.
3  
Redistribution is motivated by considerations of justice 
and equality rather than the optimal allocation of 
resources for the satisfaction of collective demands. At 
the EU level the main redistributive programmes are 
the Regional, Structural and Social Funds, including 
structural funds under CAP and Fisheries policies, and 
other minor items. The official goal of these 
programmes is to reduce income disparities within the 
Union and foster economic convergence of the poorest 
regions. As noted by Tabellini,
4 a less open rationale 
for the transfers has been to provide side-payments 
compensating losers from integration, or more 
generally spreading the benefits of integration among 
countries bargaining over what policies to coordinate, 
and how. 
Another feature of redistributive expenditures justifying 
their separate consideration is that they are 
administered by the member states and their regions, 
albeit under Commission guidelines and controls, rather 
than directly by the European Commission. 
Therefore, the transparency of the EU budget and the 
understanding of the effects of its current operations by 
the public would be greatly enhanced if spending for 
these two types of activity were presented under 
separate budgetary Chapters, as shown in Table 1. 
Direct payments to farmers under the CAP have been 
included in Chapter One, in view of their eminently 
redistributive nature, while CAP payments for market 
support, as long as they continue, should be reported 
under Chapter Two (public goods). 
                                                      
3 Richard & Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice, Fifth Edition, McGraw-Hill International Edition, 
1989, cf. Chapter 4. 
4 Guido Tabellini, The assignment of tasks in an evolving 
European Union, CEPS Policy Brief No. 10, February 2002. 
Efficiency as well as transparency considerations 
require that the activities under these two Chapters be 
financed by separate revenue sources, designed so as to 
closely mirror the nature of, and the benefit from, the 
corresponding spending flows. It seems eminently 
sensible that transfers between the member states – 
which are an essential ingredient in their negotiating 
equilibria within the European Council – be borne by 
national budgets in proportion to gross national income 
(GNI) shares in aggregate Union income. On the other 
hand, the production of European public goods should 
be financed by ‘true’ own resources, accruing directly 
to the European coffers and levied on citizens-
consumers and commercial enterprises, who reap the 
main benefits of these activities. 
The EC Treaty requires that “the revenue and 
expenditure shown in the budget shall be in balance” 
(Article 268.3). The logical and functional relation that 
we propose between revenues and expenditures within 
each of the two broad activities of the EU – 
redistribution and production of public goods – entails 
that each Chapter should show a separate zero balance. 
The concept of net balances for individual member 
states would have a meaning only for redistributive 
activities recorded in Chapter One, which by definition 
entails financial transfers between the member states. 
On the other hand, benefits from the consumption of 
public goods cannot be meaningfully imputed to 
individual member states, given their nature as 
indivisible goods, whose benefits accrue to citizens and 
commercial operators regardless of individual 
consumption and residence. To the extent that 
resources for financing public goods are directly raised 
from individual agents, there is no way of imputing 
their production costs to the member states. Therefore, 
in Chapter Two it would be meaningless and infeasible 
to calculate net balances by member state. 
At present the budget of the Union draws its resources 
from custom and agricultural levies (traditional 
resources), a VAT resource levied on a ‘notional’ 
harmonised VAT base,
5 and a ‘fourth’ resource based 
on gross national income (GNI). The latter plays a 
residual role: its amount is determined ex-post so as to 
fill the gap between actual spending and the revenues 
flowing from the traditional and VAT resources. This 
residual is allocated among the member states in 
proportion to their share in the Union’s GNI, and is 
paid by each member state out of its national budget. In 
2006 this GNI resource represented about 65% of total 
revenues. 
                                                      
5 The base is calculated on the basis of national VAT receipts 
and capped at 50% of each member’s GNI so as to correct 
for the allegedly regressive nature of VAT. In practice, when 
capping applies, this resource is turned de facto into a GNI-
based resource. Since 2002 the VAT call rate for the Union 
was 0.5%. A new budget for the European Union? | 3 
Table 1. A new structure for the EU budget 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  TRANSFERS BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES 
Expenditures  Revenues 
Structural Funds:  GNI resource 
•  European regional development fund 
•  European social fund 
Transfers under generalised correction 
mechanism 
•  Structural Funds for agriculture  Balancing item*  
•  Financial instrument for fisheries guidance   
Cohesion fund   
Direct Payments to farmers   
Other expenditures: e.g. special transfers for emergency assistance   
TOTAL CHAPTER ONE   
  TOTAL  CHAPTER ONE 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  EUROPEAN PUBLIC GOODS 
Expenditures  Revenues 
Economic policies for growth and integration  Vat – EU surcharge 
•  R&D Framework programme (including Joint Research Centre and 
other permanent outfits) 
Duties and levies 
(possibly: Energy tax) 
•  Enforcement & surveillance of Internal Market  Balancing item
* 
•  Lisbon priorities (including minimum wage)   
•  Market-related expenditures for CAP   
Internal security and immigration   
•  Border control, including Frontex   
•  Visa, legal and illegal migration, Europol, EU prosecutor, etc.      
External action   
•  Trade    
•  Common foreign service and Joint actions   
•  Development assistance   
Common defence   
•  Common procurement Agency   
Administration  
•  EU Institutions (Parliament, Council, Commission, Court of justice, 
Court of auditors, ESC, CoR, Ombudsman, etc.) 
 
•  Internal Market agencies (EMEA, Food Safety, etc …) 
•  Admin. of structural funds and special projects, and interest 
payments on EC bonds 
 
 TOTAL CHAPTER TWO  TOTAL CHAPTER TWO 
 
P.M.:   OVERALL REVENUE CEILING ON COMBINED TOTAL OF CHAPTERS I AND II:   1. 27 % OF AGGREGATE GNI. 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  CAPITAL OPERATIONS 
Expenditures  Revenues 
Special common projects: e.g. Galileo 
(-) loan reimbursement 
Proceeding from EU loans 
(-) redemptions of EU bonds 
TOTAL CHAPTER THREE  TOTAL CHAPTER THREE 
 
                                                      
* The balancing item is determined ex-post, as under current arrangements, to balance revenues and expenditures and thus respect 
the Treaty requirement of budgetary balance. 4 | Iozzo, Micossi & Salvemini 
It comes as no surprise that the present system of EU 
resources roughly corresponds to this scheme already: 
yet another confirmation that observed institutional and 
financial settings tend to reflect negotiating equilibria 
between the member states.
6  Indeed, payments 
recorded under Chapter One roughly amount to 60% of 
total spending through the EU budget, somewhat lower, 
but not too far from the observed share of the GNI 
resource; similarly, the share of spending devoted to 
European public goods is roughly in line with that of 
traditional revenues and the VAT – with about 5% of 
spending for public goods covered by budgetary 
transfers from the member states. 
The system that has been described hardly seems in line 
with the Treaty prescription that “the budget shall be 
financed wholly from own resources” (Article 269.1), 
since most resources come from the national budget of 
the member states and are allocated to the EU each year 
under national budgetary procedures. In practice, 
however, as has been seen, the actual burden-sharing 
corresponds to the prevalent redistributive purpose of 
the EU budget, where payments between the member 
states were agreed over the years as a compensation for 
the acceptance of common policies that would bring 
different benefits and impose different burdens on 
individual countries. 
However, that composition of spending no longer 
reflects European priorities, as is made clear by the 
increasing unwillingness of creditor member states to 
accept the existing structure of net payments to the EU 
budget. There also seems to be a broad consensus that, 
while the overall ceiling on resources for the EU budget 
– 1.24% of aggregate GNI – needn’t increase, a greater 
share of spending should be devoted to European 
public goods.
7 Most stakeholders and analysts consider 
that this change could be brought about by trimming 
CAP spending – i.e. by phasing out market-related 
payments and gradually renationalising direct payments 
to farmers – and correspondingly increasing the 
resources devoted to integration, growth-enhancing 
initiatives, and internal and external security. 
Were this to happen, the composition of financing 
should also evolve, so as to avoid a growing 
inconsistency between the expenditure and the revenue 
side of the EU budget. Accordingly, the weight of the 
GNI resource should decrease and that of revenues 
levied directly on European citizens should increase; it 
is in this connection that the question of a European tax 
comes to the fore. We will return to this issue. 
                                                      
6 Andrew Moravcsik, The choice for Europe: Social purpose 
and State power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
7 André Sapir et al., An Agenda for a Growing Europe: 
Making the EU System Deliver, Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
3.  A new structure for the EU budget: 
capital operations 
Besides the two Chapters that have been described, the 
EU budget should have a third Chapter for capital 
operations, to include common projects that today are 
mainly financed by current revenues but that instead – 
due to their nature of capital investment – should be 
financed by issuing Community bonds in capital 
markets. 
This is not a proposal to introduce debt financing for 
current operations of the EU, or to support public 
investment to directly stimulate growth. Capital 
markets should be tapped only to finance large projects 
of European interest identified by the European Council 
and Parliament, on the basis of a proposal by the 
Commission, with reference to strictly pre-defined 
criteria of common interest. Once the criteria for 
project selection are well identified, there seems to be 
no reason to preclude this possibility in order to fund 
projects of a European scale and distinct European 
added-value, that would significantly enhance 
European technology and capital stock and have 
measurable positive returns, albeit perhaps spread over 
long time horizons. 
The public good nature would be defined by the fact 
that individual countries would have insufficient 
incentive to undertake the investment in isolation, but 
the investment is nonetheless considered useful 
collectively, also in view of its capacity to engender 
complementary national programmes. Criteria for 
eligibility should be set in advance in a Council 
Regulation and strictly applied; projects of sole national 
interest should not be considered on the list, as was the 
case with the Trans-European Networks. 
The list of such projects should be fairly short, and their 
scale fairly large; selection on the basis of European 
value-added entails that participation of companies’ 
research outfits would be solely on the basis of their 
actual capacity to bring competences and valuable 
resources to the success of the project, not on the basis 
of sharing the initiative between member states. 
The resources thus raised should be made available to 
the projects on favourable terms – and to this end the 
Community budget could shoulder interest payments 
wholly or in part – but recipients should be required to 
pay them back over a suitable time horizon. 
Bonds should be issued directly by the European 
Commission. A new financial facility could be created 
for this purpose whose management could be delegated 
to the EIB, as already is the case with the EIF and the 
Guaranty Fund, under control of the Ecofin Council 
(the Economic and Financial Committee), Parliament 
and the Court of Auditors. A new budget for the European Union? | 5 
Examples of qualifying projects could include 
investments for the creation of cross-border material 
and immaterial infrastructures, such as networked 
research projects with large financing requirements; 
truly cross-border transport and communication 
networks; large projects for space (Galileo) and defence 
(common standards and technology platforms); 
technologies (and prototypes) for clean energy; energy 
transport facilities to eliminate existing bottlenecks and 
foster an integrated market.  
Potential beneficiaries could include universities and 
research centres, space and defence agencies, private 
and public enterprises, public administrations. As a 
rule, projects should be managed by a separate entity, 
already existing (such as the defence procurement 
Agency) or to be created ad hoc.  
4. Net  balances 
Conflict over net balances has become a major 
impediment to the creation of an EU budget more 
attuned to today’s policy priorities. Net contributors 
vote against any increase in resources since they fear 
they will carry a disproportionate burden; the 
beneficiaries of spending programmes fight hard 
against any decrease in available funds. Thus, the room 
for redirecting resources towards new priorities is slim. 
Hard-fought negotiations over net balances have also 
led to a proliferation of clauses granting special 
treatment to some member states, both on the revenue 
and spending side. The British rebate – equal to two-
thirds of its ex-ante deficit – over the years has led to 
the concession of discounts to other countries.
8 The 
overall result, however, does not appear equitable: 
countries with similar levels of prosperity are 
confronted with quite different net payments and 
receipts. As a result, not only has the budget become 
ever more opaque, but its legitimacy has been 
increasingly questioned.  
Serious change in the budget is not likely unless the net 
balance issue is resolved first; any solution can only be 
based on a generalised correction mechanism that 
would not only bring net balances automatically in line 
with some agreed criterion, but where all creditor 
member states would be treated equally. 
A proposal in this direction was put forth by the 
Commission in 2004
9 but did not make it through 
                                                      
8 Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have 
obtained a discount in the financing of the rebate as well as 
reduced rates for VAT contributions; and two of them also 
enjoy reduced GNI contributions. 
9 See Commission proposals for a Council Decision on the 
system of the EC’s own resources and for Council 
Regulation on the implementing measures for the correction 
of budgetary imbalances…, COM(2004) 501 of 3.8.2004. 
Council.
10 It was based on the idea of granting a partial 
refund to creditor member states on their net balances 
exceeding a certain threshold (as a percentage of GNI); 
the cost of the correction would be shared by all 
member states, acting de facto as a ceiling on overall 
redistribution. The presence of a threshold meant that 
net balances, as a ratio to GNI, would continue to differ 
among creditor countries. This system appears 
cumbersome and opaque as to its final effects, and falls 
short of offering a logical rationale for sharing the 
burden of redistribution. 
A better system has been recently proposed by De La 
Fuente et al.
11 whereby net balance would be kept in 
line with an index of relative prosperity – basically 
measured by real incomes per capita on a PPP basis – 
through a system of horizontal transfers between the 
member states. This scheme would fundamentally 
change member states’ incentives at the negotiating 
table, since: 
(a)  any increase in spending in favour of the citizens 
and regions of a member state would also raise its 
budgetary transfers to the Union, thus eliminating 
the incentive to free ride on the common budget; 
(b) discussion over horizontal spending programmes 
would no longer be distorted by distributional 
considerations. 
The application of this mechanism would be facilitated 
by the tripartite budget that has been outlined above, 
which explicitly separates redistributive programmes 
from other expenses and assigns the GNI resource to 
their financing. Thus, the use made of national 
budgetary allocations for the EU budget would become 
fully transparent: it would be clear how much is 
                                                      
10 On this the European Council of 16-17 December 2005 
concluded as follows: “The UK budgetary correction 
mechanism (the UK abatement) shall remain, along with the 
reduced contribution to the financing of the abatement 
benefiting Germany, Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
as agreed at the 1999 Berlin European Council. The UK 
abatement remains in full on all expenditure except in 
relation to the new Member States as set out below. Starting 
in 2013 at the latest, the UK shall fully participate in the 
financing of enlargement costs for countries which have 
acceded after 30 April 2004 except for CAP market 
expenditure 1. To this end the UK budgetary mechanism 
shall be adjusted by progressively reducing the total allocated 
expenditure in line with the modalities in Annex III. During 
the period 2007-2013 the additional contribution from the 
UK shall not be higher than 10.5 billion euro, in comparison 
with the application of the current Own Resources Decision. 
In case of future enlargement the additional contribution 
referred to above will be adjusted accordingly (except for 
Romania and Bulgaria).” 
11 Angel de la Fuente, Rafael Doménech & Vasja Rant, 
“Addressing the net balances problem as a prerequisite of EU 
budget reform”, paper prepared for the BEPA Conference on 
EU Public Finances, Brussels, 3-4 April 2008. 6 | Iozzo, Micossi & Salvemini 
refunded to each country for redistribution in favour of 
its own regions and citizens, and how much is paid to 
other member states to foster convergence, or in the 
name of solidarity. These transfers would respond to 
acceptable criteria of equity and fairness, since they 
would be closely aligned with relative income levels.  
On the other hand, since resources for the financing of 
European public goods would directly accrue to EU 
coffers without passing through national budgets, as 
will be explained below, attendant decisions would be 
freed of distributional considerations and could be 
taken solely on the grounds of common interest and 
European added-value. 
5. Own  resources 
The system of own resources does not seem to fully 
comply with the Treaty prescription that “the budget 
shall be financed wholly from own resources”, since 
most revenues are disbursed ex-post by the member 
states from their own national budgets, under the GNI 
resource. Moreover, the present system encourages the 
member states to treat the common budget as part of 
national spending priorities, and then to negotiate the 
allocation of spending in the EU budget as a 
counterpart to ‘their’ payments into the common 
budget. 
Therefore, it should be changed. This requires a 
suitable new Regulation decided by the Council under 
Article 269 of TEC (or, rather, article 312 of the 
revised Treaty, likely to be in force when the decision 
will be taken). 
As has been argued, the new system should explicitly 
envisage two different sources of current revenues: 
transfers from national budgets to finance redistribution 
between the member states would be covered by the 
GNI resource; and ’own’ resources to finance the 
production of European public goods would accrue 
directly to the EU. In this context, discussion about a 
European tax may perhaps appear less threatening even 
to the most ardent custodians of national sovereignty.  
First, as has been described, there would be no new 
burdens for European taxpayers, but only a different 
structure of revenue collection, since the overall cap on 
EU resources would not change. Second, the 
composition of total revenues as between transfers from 
national budgets and direct tax collection from 
taxpayers for the EU budget would depend on the 
composition of spending. More direct tax collection 
could only come about as a result of explicit decisions 
by Council and Parliament to reduce redistributive 
transfers and increase common policies, say for border 
control or common defence. Increased tax collection 
from citizens would directly correspond to an increased 
provision of public goods at the EU level, compensated 
by reduced taxation at national level. 
As to the forms of direct tax collection by the Union, 
any tax levied at the EU level should respond to simple 
principles of efficiency and transparency. Therefore, 
EU taxes:  
(a)  should have a broad base and be levied at a small 
rate, to minimise allocative distortions (neutrality);  
(b) should be simply and uniformly assessed 
(simplicity); 
(c)  should be automatically transferred to the EU 
without going through national budgets 
(independence); 
(d) should make EU citizens aware of what they pay to 
the EU budget (transparency);  
(e)  would not need to worry about redistributive goals, 
which would be addressed by appropriate spending 
programmes and would be financed separately 
(subsidiarity). 
These criteria seem to rule out all forms of direct 
taxation, since the criteria of simplicity and 
independence could not be met. In particular, a 
corporate income tax would not meet any of the above 
criteria, given the small tax base and the different 
criteria for corporate taxation in the member states. 
The natural candidate to supply most resources for the 
production of European public goods is the VAT, 
which can meet all of the above criteria and already has 
a common infrastructure for tax administration and 
collection. VAT revenues from a ‘European surcharge’ 
could be channelled directly to the EU coffers. Overall 
VAT rates would not change, but invoices and cashier 
receipts throughout the value chain would show 
separate charges for the national and the EU VAT, so 
as to make citizens aware of the destination of their 
money. 
Recourse to other taxes linked to specific goals should 
not be excluded, provided they respect the criteria 
described above. One candidate that comes to mind is 
some form of energy tax, that could strengthen 
incentives for energy saving, and whose revenues could 
be used for funding research on clean energy and other 
actions to promote energy efficiency Europe-wide. 
6. Decision  making 
All the changes that have been discussed would lose 
much relevance if budgetary decisions remained 
uninfluenced by citizens’ will and political orientations 
within public opinion. To this end, some changes in 
decision-making are also required to bring fundamental 
choices before the electorate on the occasion of 
European election and to unify decisions on the 
European budget. A new budget for the European Union? | 7 
The Treaty of Lisbon has changed decision-making on 
budgetary matters by: 
(a)  Bringing the multi-annual financial framework 
(MFF) into the Treaty (art. 312) and involving 
Parliament in the decision (Council must obtain the 
consent of Parliament); decisions will be taken by 
unanimity, but the European Council may authorise 
Council to decide by qualified majority voting;  
(b) Applying co-decision between Council and 
Parliament to yearly budgets; 
(c)  Eliminating the category of compulsory 
expenditures, that notably subtracted agriculture 
spending from Parliament’s remit. 
The expanded powers of Parliament offer the 
opportunity to ‘politicise’ discussions on budgetary 
allocations and bring political differences before the 
electorate on the occasion of European elections. The 
required adjustments in decision-making procedures 
can be implemented without Treaty changes. 
Firstly, all decisions on multi-annual programmes 
should be brought into the single framework of the 
MFF, and the practice of separate negotiations on 
agriculture and research programmes should be 
discontinued. Thus, it would be possible to move to a 
unitary consideration of all expenditures in the EU 
budget and to evaluate the trade-offs involved in 
assigning resources to different budget lines. 
Secondly, the duration of the MFF should be aligned 
with the term of office of Parliament, running for five 
years. Parliament could then seek a mandate from the 
electorate on the desirable evolution of the budget at 
each European election. Popular legitimacy would 
strengthen the Parliament’s hand in its negotiations 
with Council. For this approach to be feasible, the 
decisions on the MFF would have to be adopted by 
Council and Parliament around mid-term in the 
legislature. 
Parliament and Council should consider applying all 
the above changes already to the decisions on the MFF 
starting in 2014. Parliament can foster such an 
evolution by refusing to collaborate on a budgetary 
process based on old rules.  
7. Summing  up 
The ongoing review of the EU budget offers an 
important opportunity to break with the past and move 
to a budget that really can reflect current policy needs 
and priorities. In this regard, the European Commission 
bears huge responsibilities, since its proposals will 
shape the debate in Council and Parliament. 
This paper does not address new policy priorities for 
the European budget, a separate subject that would 
have required much lengthier treatment.
12 Rather, our 
focus has been on the structure of the European budget 
and the relationship that should be established between 
the expenditure and the revenue side.  
Our main proposal is to partition all operations in the 
current EU budget into two separate Chapters, devoted 
respectively to redistributive transfers (Chapter One) 
and the production of European public goods (Chapter 
Two). Each Chapter would have its own dedicated 
sources of revenue: transfers from the member states to 
finance redistribution, and taxes levied at European 
level to finance European public goods. Each Chapter 
would have to be in balance at all times.  
Within this new budgetary framework, the issue of net 
balances can be strictly confined to sharing the burden 
of redistribution within Chapter One. A system of 
horizontal transfers between the member states should 
ensure that net balances remain strictly in line with 
relative income levels on a PPP basis at all times, based 
on the method recently proposed by Angel de la 
Fuentes, Rafael Doménech and Vasja Rant. This 
change would remove from budgetary negotiations all 
incentives for the member states to fight for larger 
funds since – given the constraint on net balances – any 
euro of extra transfers obtained by one country for its 
regions or citizens would be paid back under the GNI 
resource. 
We have also argued that the Union should be allowed 
to tap capital markets by issuing bonds to finance large 
projects of European interest that have positive returns, 
even if over long time-frame, and therefore can be paid 
back. Union bonds would in no case finance current 
operations. Project selection would meet strict criteria 
of European value-added set in advance by Council and 
Parliament. 
Finally, decision-making procedures should be changed 
so as to ensure that all expenditures be decided 
simultaneously, so that all relevant trade-off involved 
in the decision to spend in the different programmes is 
taken fully into account. The duration of the MFF 
should be aligned with the term of office of Parliament, 
and budgetary priorities should become a matter for 
European elections. 
                                                      
12 See Daniel Gros, How to achieve a better budget for the 
European Union, CEPS Working Document No. 289, April 
2008. About CEPS
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complemented by an extensive network of 
partner institutes throughout the world.
Goals
•	 To	carry	out	state-of-the-art	policy	research	leading	
to	solutions	to	the	challenges	facing	Europe	today.
•	 To	achieve	high	standards	of	academic	excellence	
and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	provide	a	forum	for	discussion	among	all	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	a	
regular	flow	of	publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Formation	of	nine	different	research	networks,	
comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.